A timely need for shipping companies to implement the ISM Code and establish a safety management system by Saleem, Mohammad Syed
World Maritime University 
The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World Maritime 
University 
World Maritime University Dissertations Dissertations 
1996 
A timely need for shipping companies to implement the ISM Code 
and establish a safety management system 
Mohammad Syed Saleem 
WMU 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations 
 Part of the Transportation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Saleem, Mohammad Syed, "A timely need for shipping companies to implement the ISM Code and 
establish a safety management system" (1996). World Maritime University Dissertations. 918. 
https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/918 
This Dissertation is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for 
non-commercial, fair use academic purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without 




A TIMELY NEED FOR SHIPPING COMPANIES
TO IMPLEMENNT THE ISM CODE
AND ESTABLISH A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Capt. Syed Mohammad Saleem
Pakistan
A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial






0 Copyright Capt. Syed Mohan-n-rndSaleem. 1996
DE CLARATION
I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my own work has been
identified, and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been
conferred on me.
The contents of this dissertation reflect my own personal views, and are not












Name: Capt. Dimitris C Mitsatsos
Office: Director General HELMEPA
Institution/organisation: Hellenic Marine Environment Protection Association
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I acknowledge that all thanks belong to Almighty Allah, who participates in and
oversees all human endeavour, in whom I trust and believe for inspiration.
I owe my earnest gratitude to M/S Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and the
Directorate of Ports and Shipping wing for having nominated me to take up this
course of study.
I am indebted to the Secretary General of the International Maritime Organisation for
providing me with a scholarship from his special fimds.
I wish to express my sincere thanks and deepest appreciation to worthy course
professor Theodore J Sampson for all the education he has imparted into me with all
the encouragement to pursue this course successfully. I am impressed with his
dedicated personality.
I would also like to convey my sincere gratitude to the supervisor of my dissertation
Lecturer P.G.Jeppesen without whose able guidance it was very difficult to
accomplish this task.
My special thanks and appreciation to Cecilia, Susan and the rest of the library staff
for their invaluable support and assistance during my research in the library and on
the intemet.
I would also like to express my gratitude to the distinguished professors and the staff
of WMU, who have always been a source of knowledge and assistance during my
stay in the university.
Finally I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to my dear mother, for her endless
prayers, and to my dear wife Sofia and our beloved children Irfan, Adnan, Asra and
Azlan for their patience, understanding and moral support.
May Allah bless us all.
ABSTRACT
Shipping operates in a dynamic enviromnent as ever. The increase in the volume of
trade, advancement in technologies and the world wide economic competitions and
pressures have created enonnous complexities in the shipping business. The need to
prevent the loss of lives and damages to environment is felt much greater today than
it was ever in the past.
This study while analysing the past history, present status and future expectations of
shipping, aims at creating the requisite safety culture awareness and realisation of the
timely need for remedial measures. The dissertation invites attention in general of all
those having a responsibility towards safety of life at sea and in particular shipping
companies.
‘X Safety Management is hard to achieve with ignorance of Quality Management. In
this dissertation Quality Management has been explained to its desired extent to
understand its inevitable link with Safety Management Systems.
The ISM Code and "itsSafety Management System is basically designed to improve
Quality Management Systems of shipping at least to a level where protection against
loss of lives and damages to environment is secured to 2-globally accepted reasonable
extent. This study emphasises upon the implementation of the code as soon as
possible. The dissertation also convincingly suggests adoptable ways and procedures
for the implementation of the code which is accessable and relatively easy to
understand by the majority.
In formulating this dissertation the methodology used is the consultation of books on
the topic as well as the relevant literature from international conferences, reflecting
on the author's own experience gained whilst working onboard various ships and
ashore in the office of a shipping company, learning and collecting of relevant
information through field trips, library research and valuable lectures received at the
World Maritime University.
It is hoped that this dissertation will serve as a concise guide for shipping companies
to realise the timely need for the implementation of the ISM Code. This study should
also help to formulate procedures to establish a successful Safety Management
System.
Shipping companies who are operating only the traditional cargo vessels, the
compliance of the ISM Code shall be obligatory by the year 2002, while for those
who are operating passenger ships including passenger high speed crafi, oil and
chemical tankers, bulk carn'ers,gas carriers and cargo high speed crafis of 500 gross
tonnes and over the ISM Code shall be obligatory just in a matter of a little over one
year from now. 1 July 1998.
However the thrust of the dissertation is to persuade such shipping companies about
the need for compliance with the ISM Code as soon as possible not withstanding the
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1.0. INTRODUCTION
The International Safety Management Code has not emerged all of a sudden. It is the
results of many years of experiences and disastrous accidents at sea, which the
shipping has gone through in the past and which the industry can not sustain any
more, if it is to exist in tenns of sustainable development in shipping of today.
To understand timely need of the ISM code, it is necessary to realise the importance
of shipping in the international trade, and the dynamic environments in which the
shipping has to continue to prosper with particular regard to the safety of life and the
protection of environment.
1.1 Maritime trade demand and the shipping traffic.
Year Loaded seaborne trade Percentage annual change
1970 2.605 billion tonnes 13.0
1973 and 1979 World Oil Crises
1980 3.704 billion tonnes -2.0
1993 4.330 billion tonnes 2.6
1994 4.485 billion tonnes 3.6
1995 4.651 billion tonnes 3.7
Worlds Fleet Size (principal types of vessels)
1993 710.622 million dead weight tonnes
1994 719.804 million dead weight tonnes
1995 734.917 million dead weight tonnes
( percentage change 1994/1995. 2.1 )
It is said that while a maritime demand may increase by 3-5 % a year on average for
a period of 20 years, it can change by as much as 10-20 percent or even more in a
year. (Ma.,1995,Lecture2).
1.2 Maritime Environment and Accidents at Sea
Like all transport activities maritime transport activity is also prone to casualties in
fact severe accidents. As a human instinct measures to prevent accidents have
always been established to achieve safety of life at sea to a level corresponding to
expected risks of accidents..
The shipping industry functions in a very dynamic environment. The complex and
constantly changing maritime enviromnent is very conductive to ship accidents
endangering safety of life at sea and the environment.
Prevention of accidental pollution is also very closely linked to safety, as the crew is
likely to be endangered by any incident which involves a breach in the integrity of a
vessel sufficient to cause pollution.
Prevention of pollution is thus best achieved by preventing accidents. Conversely
measures to prevent pollution are likely to improve safety.
To err is human. Man makes mistakes and provided it is not made deliberately, he
learns out of his mistakes and the process of evolution continues.
1.3 Factors Contributing to Accidents at Sea.
Maritime transport has many error-inducing factors. It has a high ratio of incidents
and near misses to accidents.
A disastrous maritime casualty is just the tip of an iceberg. It reveals very little if
treated as an isolated incident. Every such incident is a pointer to the existence of
many more unpublicised minor incidents and many more near misses.
However some of the more readily apparant factors contributing to accidents at sea
may include the following:
1.3.1 Economic Recessionary Periods.
It has been observed by many a seafarer that during the shipping industry recession
periods of the 1980s, the traditional quality, maintenance and performance standards
were sacrificed to combat recessionary impacts. Greater emphasis was placed on cost
reduction. As a result there was a temptation to reduce quality standards. Although
quality and safety go hand in hand to accomplish long term benefits, the shipping
industry appeared to be putting its long tenn interests at stake in order to achieve
short term benefits.
1.3.2 Ageing of Ships.
In the early 1970s the oil industries were booming. The shipping industry was also
affected positively with the result that many ships were constructed during those
periods ( especially tankers ) and many new vessels were commissioned for trading
at sea. All those ships are getting older now. The average age of the existing fleet of
vessels is steadily increasing. Because of the recessionary economic environments,
the ship owners do not find it profitable to invest in new fleet tonnage. Under the
present regime of environment when it is specially necessary to pay more attention to
the maintenance and upkeep of existing ships, some of the ship operators are taking
unacceptable chances in respect of safety and environmental hazards.
1.3.3 Substandard Practices.
The open registry practice concept emerged after the second world war.This practice
is being blamed by many as being one of the causes of substandard ships sailing in
international waters today.
In 1993 the worlds biggest shipping flags were the two countries that were famous
for second registry.
On account of relaxation in taxes and to some extent low operational costs , there are
in the world a dozen countries which are practising open registry of merchant ships.
However according to the United Nations statistics, five countries dominate the
shipping trade market and combined they have attracted more than a third of the
worlds total tonnage. These are the top second registry practitioner countries.
Unfortunately the misuse of the flag of convenience practices over the last two
decades has severed the links of loyalty between ownership and crew and
contributed on lower costs, exploitation, low morale and poor standard in
shipping.This attitude developes lack of motivation and commitment to safety which
in turn may become the cause of many serious accidents at sea.
The following is an example of a substandard Ro-Ro vessel. The defects were
recorded as follows:.
0 - The steering gear was unreliable, bridge engine controls were from two
different manufacturers and neither pitch indicators or shafi tachometers
functioned.
0 - Deck plating was wasted and holed, the elevator watertight hatch could not be
secured. The bow visor could not be locked and there were major fractures to
the ramp hinges.
0 - The ballast tanks were almost unusable due to corrosion. Some were blanked off,
others had multiple leaks, one into the engineroom. The majority of sounding
pipes were wasted.
0 - In the accomodation there was no hot water because the boilers had burnt out,
the toilets had no flushing systems and the air conditioning did not fimction.
0 - There were in adequate glasses, crockery and cutlery, linen and blankets. The
medical chest was empty.
o - Fire fighting equipment did not work, the fire main was blanked off to the
superstructure. The breathing apparatus set was unusable.
o - The majority of life jackets were unusable, there was no starboard embarkation
ladder and the life boats could not be swung out because the davits were too
corroded.
Despite all above defects it was worthwhile to note that:
0 A new safety certificate had just been issued.
Many of the deficiencies appeared in the old class survey reports, but were absent
in the latest ones.
Port state inspectors had visited the ship on a number of occasions.
The shipmaster took reasonable steps to inform the management company of the
defects and requested that those affecting the seaworthiness of the vessel be made
good. The master was dismissed. (NI, Seaway,l991, page 3)
1.3.4 Efforts of Maximisation of Profits.
The developments in the communication systems may be considered a remarkable
achievement of this century.
Traditionally the shipmaster is fully responsible regarding the decisions in respect of
the safety of crew, cargo and his ship. As such he was equally involved in the
commercial decisions making process for his vessel.
In a depressed economic scenario commercial considerations may take precedence
over safety aspects in the decision making process of the shipping companies ashore.
With the development of sophisticated, reliable and efficient ship - shore
communication systems it is now possible to communicate with a ship at sea at all
times with very little efforts. Thus major decisions are made ashore by the owners
and operators and conveyed to the master for implementation by the ship.
Although the Master still feels responsible for the safety of the ship its cargo and
crew, he may find it very difficult to countermand an unsafe decision taken ashore.
With the result that the role of the Master seemed diminished with the abuse of
improved communication. It may be realised that no matter how much technology
advances, the human beings can not be eliminated. The man on the spot namely the
Master should be reinstated with authority.
1.3.5 Cyclic Nature of Freight Rates.
Generally it has been noticed that when the international freight market is
prospective, more ships which mostly include older ones are taken out of lay-up and
additional crew requirements are filled in by less experienced ones who might not
otherwise be employed at sea. Such a ship would be a hazard at sea. The above
practice is very much subject to the cyclic nature of freight rates. The opportunity
costs of such practices is a disaster at sea sometimes.
1.4 Concerns of the International Maritime Organisation.
From the early days sensible maritime countries of the world had their concerns
about safety and oil pollution at sea and depended a lot on co-operation from
maritime countries all round the world.
Safety regulations have their origin in the loss of TITANIC in 1912. This disaster
raised so many questions about maritime safety standards that it was decided to hold
an international conference to discuss new safety regulations. This resulted in the
adoption of SOLAS convention on 20 January 1914. It introduced new international
requirements dealing with the safety of navigation for all merchant ships such as
watertight and fire resistant bulkheads, life saving appliances and fire prevention and
fire fighting appliances on Passenger ships, Radiotelegraphy and establishment of a
North Atlantic ice patrol. Due to out break of war, the convention could not enter into
force. However in 1929, the second SOLAS convention was adopted which included
several new regulations and also updated some of the existing ones.
The Oil pollution of the sea especially in ports and harbours was first recognised as a
problem before the first world war and during the 1920s and 1930s various countries
introduced measures to control discharges of oil within their tenitorial waters and
provide deterrents in the fonn of fines for illegal discharges
Despite all above and subsequent regulations in respect of safety and pollution
prevention, accidents continued to occur. In fact when we look upon accidents within
the marine industry we find an alarming increase. Several accidents causing
extensive loss of lives and extensive pollution have been too frequent during the last
decades. Some accidents have had high impact on the society and public at large and
triggered international regulations and conventions as well as national requirements
the consequences of which are not totally foreseeable.
Some of the more well known accidents are as follows:
1912 Titanic SOLAS
1967 Torrey Canyon OILPOL
1976 Amoco Cadiz MARPOL / STCW
1987 Herald of Free Enterprise IMO RES A 647
1988 Exxon Valdez OPA 90
1989 Scandinavian Star Management System Requirements






Sea Empress as on 29 February 1996.
It is worth noticing that the public in general is only aware of disasters involving loss
of passengers life and pollution. Very few outside the shipping world know of all the
bulkcaniers accidents which has caused the loss of hundreds of seafarers life and
seemingly continue to do so, although some decrease has been seen the last years.
In 1954, the United Kingdom organised a conference on the danger of oil pollution
which resulted in the adoption of the international convention for the prevention of
pollution of the sea by oil, following entry into force of the IMO convention in 1958.
In view of the enormous growth in the maritime transport of oil and the size of
tankers, the increasing amount of chemicals being carried at sea and a growing
concern for the worlds environment as a whole it was felt that the 1954 oil pollution
convention was not adequate, despite the various amendments which had been
adopted. The IMO assembly partly inspired by the Torry Canyon disaster 1967
decided to adopt a completely new convention. The conference was convened in
1973.
As for SOLAS, the ratification of the 1948 SOLAS convention took so long that it
was felt necessary to adopt a completely new instrument. Hence the fotuth SOLAS
convention of 1960 which incorporated numerous technical improvements came into
existence.
But during the 1960s membership of IMO was increasing. More and more countries
had secured their independence and many of them soon began to develop their own
merchant fleets. Efforts to keep the 1960 SOLAS convention in line with technical
developments by amendments were doomed to failure because of the nature of the
amendment procedure adopted at the 1960 conference.
As a result the 1974 SOLAS convention was adopted which incorporated all the
amendments to the 1960 SOLAS and included a new amendment procedure so that
future amendments may be brought into force within an acceptable period of time.
In the meantime a series of accidents involving oil tankers in the winters of 1976 ­
77, led to increasing pressure for fimher international action. As a result early in
1978 IMO convened an international conference on tanker safety and pollution
prevention which adopted a number of important modifications to SOLAS as well as
to MARPOL 1973.
Since the SOLAS 1974 had not entered into force, the conference decided to adopt a
Protocol with the new amendment procedure. The protocol entered into force on 1
May 1981.
In addition with a view to reinstate centralised authority with regard to safety and
environmental decisions, it was realised with great concern that the man-on-the-spot
namely the Master on board the ship needed to be reinstated with authority. IMO
Resolution A.443 (X1), adopted on 15 November 1979 states:
Considering that maritime safety and protection of the marine
environment must be the shipmaster’s prime concern in all
situations which arise and that economic and other pressures on
the shipmaster should not at any time interfere with the decisions
he must take in that regard.
Considering further that the decisions on maritime safety and
marine environment protection by the ship master should not be
unduly influenced by instructions given by the ship owners,
charterers or other concerned.
Invites governments to take necessary steps to safeguard the
shipmaster in proper discharge of his responsibilities in regard to
maritime safety and the protection of marine environment by
ensuring that:
(a ) The shipmaster is not constrained by the ship owners,
charteres or any other persons from taking in this respect any
decision which, in the professional judgement of the shipmaster is
necessary.
( b ) The shipmaster is protected by appropriate provisions
including the right of appeal, contained in, inter alia, national
legislation, collective agreements or contracts of employment,
from unjustifiable dismissal or other unjustifiable action by ship
owner, charterers or any other person as a consequence of the
proper exercise of his professional judgement.
The resolution never achieved the status of an international regulation. Although the
Master's responsibility in matters concerning maritime safety and protection of the
marine environment was accepted, his authority to countennand any decision taken
ashore by the owner / operator, which may be detrimental to safety at sea and
protection of the marine environment was not explicit. These facts led to the
conclusion that there was an urgent need for control of owners and operators in
matters concerning safety at sea and environment protection.
2.0 EVOLUTION OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
2.1 Analysis of the Causes of the Accidents.
Effective strategies for management of safety and pollution prevention must be based
on an in-depth understanding of the human element in maritime accidents.
It was and is obvious that the IMO and the shipping industry needed to address the
human side of ship management in a new and better way. A sort of safety and
pollution prevention management is necessary. Accidents do not just happen.
Accidents are usually the results of ofien many contributing elements of which each
one certainly is manageable.
A typical way of dealing with the circumstances a remedial measure by regulatory
bodies is to impose more stringent construction and equipment requirements and to
prescribe modifications to shipboard operational practices. This course of action
leads to believe that accidents are caused exclusively by technical factors and that it
is the technical causes which need to be remedied.
As such 80 % of the conventions such as SOLAS, MARPOL, Loadline, Class Rules
etc. deal with technical matters and only 20 % ( and not even that ) deal with the
human side.
Efforts to improve the safety of life at sea and equipment aboard sea going vessels, or
to protect the environment in which those vessels operate has centred largely on
technological innovations. Double hulls, advances in steering gear technology,
electronic navigation equipment, Arpa and stress monitoring equipment have all
helped to reduce the number of accidents at sea.
But in spite of the advances made in the technology, accidents at sea continued to
occur. Names hang like banners headlines in the marine consciousness. Herald of
Free Enterprise, Exxon Valdez, Braer and Estonia. It has finally been recognised that
the root cause of most accidents is the HUMAN ELEMENT. Almost 80 % of the
accidents can now be labelled as related to Human Failure, which also can be named
substandard practice and only 20 % fall into the category of Technical Failure.
Most accidents are caused by a combination of the two factors and most equipment
or structural failures will ultimately have resulted from human failure, perhaps
through carelessness in design, construction, or maintenance at an earlier stage.
In 1993 the UK and P&I club published its third annual analysis of major claims
arising over the six years period from 1987 - 1992.
In the opinion of the research team 50 % of all cargo claims, 50 % of all pollution
claims, 65 % of all injury claims and 80 % of all property damage claims were due to
Human Error. Pilot error caused 34 % of major property damage claims.
Human error is the overwhelming dominant factor in claims of all sizes. In looking at
major claims ( those in excess of USD 100,000 ), the report found that more than 62
% were directly attributed to error by one or more individuals. This figure applies
only to P & I club claims. Among those claims attributed primary to mechanical and
structural failure there are many in which the human element has also played an
important part.
Ships in the 10 - 14 years age bracket seem to experience the highest incident rate of
Human error. This may reflect excessive pressure on ships designed to run with
larger crews than is now the practice or accumulated lack of maintenance prior to the
third special survey.
2.2 Human Error Element.
An accident is a chance combination of causes producing an unfortunate result.
Professor W Wagenor ( 1993 ) in his paper on behalf of SIGGTTO “ Accidents at
Sea: Multiple causes and impossible consequences define an accident as follows .
Accidents appeared to be the result of highly complex coincidences
which could rarely be foreseen by the people involved.
The unpredictability is caused by the large numbers of causes and by
the spread of information over participants. Also the nature of errors
that are made indicates lack of understanding rather than a lack of
motivation or risk propensity. Accidents occur because the behaviours
that causes them is not seen as risky. Errors of information processing
(mostly lack of attention ) are made frequently but are under normal
conditions, not punished by accidents.
2.2.1 Errors and Violations.
Professor James Reason, in his book “ HUMAN ERROR “ first published in 1990,
suggests that the most basic division should be between Errors and Violations in
categorising Human Involvement.
Errors: Is a slip, lapse or mistakes on the part of an individual which is
unintentional.
Miszlatisznz where rules or procedures that are in place are intentionally
or deliberately not followed.
Errors and Violations may be Active or Latent.
Amy: : An error or violation usually associated with the performance of front
operators ( pilots, Control rooms, Crews and the like ) has an
immediate impact upon the system and leads directly to an incident /
accident / near miss.
Lat_em_: An error or violation most often generated by those at the “blunt end”
of the system ( designers, managers, construction crews etc. ) which
does not lead directly to an undesirable occurrence but remains
doorrnat in the system until such a time when it combines with a
series of events to trigger and result in an accident.
Errors occur at different level of Skill. Latent errors are considered to be more
pervasive, more dangerous and far more difficult to detect than Active errors.
When it comes to potential, preventative or remedial measures the distinction
between the two can help to identify the most effective approach. The categories
commonly used are those defined by Professor Reason and are given below with
some examples.
: Thoserrorswhichoccuroftenatalevelwherewearenot
conscious that we have made them, because the error is
made in can'ying out a skill that is largely automatic. The
navigating officer of the watch inadvertently switches the
radar to three miles range instead of the six miles range ­
as a consequence he believes that targets are twice as far
away as they really are. The officer knows how to
operate the equipment but he makes a mistake.
In carrying out tasks that are familiar but require our
attention we apply rules concerning how we lcnow a
particular situation operates. Errors are liable to occur if
we are not attentive, for example, the navigating officer
of the watch fixes the ship’s position solely by the use of
one single electronic means of navigation (Radar or
Lor'an....) or even work wiyhout double checking his
observations visually.
In encountering unfamiliar situations we must develop
new rules and ways of operating . Errors at this level are
related to problem solving and applying past experience
to new situations. A Tanker approaching port requests
steam on deck for manoeuvring purposes. An
experienced engineer simply opens the steam valve
resulting in excessive “water hammer" and subsequent
failure of the steam line, thus rendering the vessel
incapable of completing mooring operafions.
An electrician working on a live switch board without
wearing the correct protective clothing or standing on
mbber mats. He is aware of his violation but it is easier
for him to cut comers and complete his task before the
afiemoon tea break.
: Thenavigatingofficerofthewatchknowsverywellthat
international COLREGS require ships to reduce speed in
bad visibility yet he chooses to ignore that rule and to
proceed at full sea speed in dense fog.
K ‘ ‘ Based ‘v" ‘ " A seaman wilfully disregards the knowledge and
training he has received by entering an enclosed space
without taking appropriate precautions. He is overcome
by toxic fumes and collapses.
2.2.2 Human Behavioural Conditions.
The consultants currently engaged in the comprehensive review and revision of the
1978 STCW convention have identified several categories of human behavioural
conditions which can contribute to accidents and which could be influenced at least
to some degree, with proper training and improved shipboard practices and
operational arrangements.
The consultants have recognised that casualties typically result from a chain of
events which include human action or inaction or misjudgement by someone
involved in the events. Training for effective human intervention can break the chain
before a human error can lead to a casualty. The items in the following outline have
been derived from a consideration of casualty reports and other data as well as from
a general appreciation of human nature and human behaviour.£Clipsham,l995,9)
1. ' “ " /Lackof *" ii
Contributing Factors - stress, anxiety
- fatigue
- extended periods of responsibility
- recklessness /carelessness
2. _C_onfi.isis2n
Contributing factors - too little time to assess situation & determine effective
action
- too many tasks required to be performed at once
- failure to prioritise tasks properly
- too many decisions to make, or factors to assess, or
facts to remember at once (cognitive overload )
- misinterpretation of data
- ambiguous relation ship between Master and Pilot
- ambiguous relationship between Master & officer in charge
of navigational watch
- insufficient information exchanged when changing watches
- insufficient hand over procedures
3. _Er9_c_eduLaLnL0_blems
Contributing factors- failure to follow proper procedures
- inadequate procedural guidance
- inaccurate procedural guidance
- failure to co-ordinate with others
- procedures performed too fast
- failure to verify completion of task
- inadequate testing of systems
4. ' useof ' ‘ ‘ “ "
Contributing Factors - unfamiliar with shipboard arrangements
- unfamiliar with specific item of equipment
( including new equipment )
- misuse of equipment, in a manner not consistent
with recommendations & users manual
—using equipment for purposes other than intended
by manufacturer
5, ‘ ' ‘ and Morale
Contributing Factors - Untrained individual(s) assigned to task
- improper assignment of duties
- ineffective supervision of individuals who are not
fiilly trained for duties
- defuse order-giving, unclear instructions
- rapid personnel tumover
- irregular wages/pay
- poor food and social conditions
6. Infonnatisznkroblems
Contributing Factors - Inefficient system of infonnation flowing to and
from management
- inadequate information available
- inaccurate record keeping
- inaccurate reports
- too much infonnation available
- conflicting / ambiguous infonnation available
7. Cnmmunisatiorrnrohlems
Contributing Factors - lack of common language
- ambiguous communication
- speech disability
8. K ' ’ ’ exner-it-nee ‘ ‘
Contributing Factors - failure to recognise threatening or potentially
hazardous conditions
- inadequate theoretical knowledge
- inadequate practical experience
- outdated / obsolete knowledge
- inadequate ability to read and write
- failure to make effective use of physical use of senses
( sight, hearing, touch, smell and tastes ) for early
detection of adverse developments
9. Pmriudssmem
Contributing Factors - failure to anticipate a developing problem
- failure to call for assistance when needed
- misinterpretation of data
- failure to appreciate equipment limitations
- failure to appreciate human limitations
There are of course other human element factors which relate primarily to physical or
mental fitness, fatigue, drug and alcohol abuse, eyesight and hearing disability as
well as crew morale and motivation and shipboard management. While such human
element factors are complex and can not be resolved solely by training they should
not be neglected.
2.3 Review of Causes of Accidents.
The following is a review of causes of accidents conducted by the P & I club to carry
out a more searching inquiry with the object of reducing claims. This appeared in the
September issue of Seaway 1993(Capt M.Pickthome,RD,EXC,BA,MNI).
The parameters used to conduct the review were: ship type; age; flag; and class.
Various questions were asked and answers found. For instance what type of ships hit
docks most ofien? Not ferries who go in and out of docks every day but bulk carriers
who may only go in and out only once a month. This is because the ferry has
specialist equipment such as bow thrusters. It also goes in and out of the same port
all the time and the Captain and the ship’s crew become very skilled at berthing their
vessel in the same place Bulkers of course have little practice, use many different
ports and are large unwieldy ships without special manoeuvring devices.
Excluding the headline - garbing major incidents who are the greatest pollution risks?
Not tankers but ordinary dry cargo vessels which are more likely to have an over spill
while bunkering than a tanker is while loading.
Their analysis told them who were the worst risks by flag and by class among their
members. A list was produced showing those ships likely to have the worst claims
record. They comprised the following
1 - old reefers carrying chilled cargoes.
2 - declassed (for oil) OBO carriers.
3 - old parcel tankers on the spot market.
4 - VLCC’s operated by pure speculators.
5 - tween deckers of any age, size or descriptions
In fact the last named on the list was described as the worst of them all . By age of
vessels, the majority of cargo claims were generated by those in the 16 to 19 years
age group
In finding out the underlying causes of the accidents some quite surprising results
came to light. For example taking personnel injury claims it was noted that over 50
% were categorised as due to the carelessness of the individual workers. This was
considered as the primary cause, but examination in depth showed the following
results:
Lack of supervision 30 %; Over confidence 15 %; Lack of training 7 '/2%, Lack of
maintenance 10 %; Lack of procedures 7 %; Man not attentive 10 % and others 20
%. These figures were compiled for the number of claims for personnel injury only
and it will be noted that carelessness ( Man not attentive ) is attributed to only 10 %
of the underlying causes. Research into other types of claims such as contact
damages and pollution damage showed similar differences.
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It is not sufficient to know that 80 % of accidents are caused by Human Errors , but it
is useful to know that 50 % are related to out of date procedures. In fact this gives an
indication where to concentrate the remedial efforts.
2.4 Recent IMO Efforts
By the late 1980's it was widely recognised that safe, pollution free and efficient ship
operations require good management both ashore and on board. Investigations
following the loss of the R0 R0 ferry Herald of Free Enterprise, on 6 March 1987,
revealed a lack of standards in management of safety in shipping.
.At the 15th session of the IMO assembly, in November 1987 the United Kingdom
proposed that it was necessary to develop international standards for safety
management in shipping. This led to the adoption of Resolution A 596 (15) which
recognised that the great majority of maritime accidents are attributed to human
related causes and that the safety of ships will be increased by improving operating
practices. Resolution A 596 (15 ) requested the MSC and MEPC to urgently develop
guidelines conceming shipboard and shorebased management procedures for safety
operation of Passenger and R0 R0 fenies. In early 1987 the tanker Exxon Valdez ran
aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling 270,000 barrels of Prudhoe Bay
Crude Oil into an ecologically sensitive environment. Even before formal
investigations were concluded accusative fingers were pointed at the evident failing
in the safety management systems, both on board and ashore. This added impetus to
the process of development of Safety Management Guidelines by IMO. Resolution
A 647 (16 ), IMO Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships and for
pollution prevention was adopted on 19 October 1989. Although these guidelines
were recommendatory in nature, it was a substantial step, by IMO , towards
encouraging shipping companies to put safety and environment protection measures
high on their list of priorities.
Resolution A.647 (16 ) also required the MSC and MECP to periodically review
these guidelines and consider need for amendments in the light of experience gained.
Recommendation for amendments to these guidelines were made by MSC at its 59th
session and by the MEPC at its 31st session. These recommendations were
incorporated into the guidelines . At its 17th session the IMO Assembly adopted
Resolution A: 680 (17), the revised ‘IMO Guidelines on Management for the Safe
Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention’, on 6 November 1991. These
revised guidelines were also subject to review by the MSC and MEPC.
The joint MSC / MEPC working group used these revised guidelines as a basis for
development of the ‘International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships
and for Pollution Prevention’, ( ISM Code ). The ISM code was annexed to
Resolution A. 741 (18), which was adopted by the IMO Assembly on 17 November
1993.
2.4.1 Efforts of Shipping Industries Towards Safety Management System.
The shipping indushy has always been in the fore fronts in the search of quality of
service which was never possible without safety and environmental protections.
While developing their various programmes, they too realised that an efficient
management is afier all very vital for the achievement of their goals.
As early as 30 April 1991, the International Ship Managers Association ( ISMA )
was established. Their contribution to the global safety and environment appeared in
the form of Code of Ship Management. This group of Ship Management Companies
which was famously known as the “ The Ggroup of Five" worked extensively in the
development of a comprehensive Quality Code for Shipping which was completed in
December 1990. As it is today the conditions necessary to become a member of the
ISMA is the compliance with the ISMA Code. In 1995, ISMA already had around
40 member companies, who operate an aggregate of around 1900 seagoinf, ships
totalling 60 million tonnes dead-weight. ( Meyor,l99S, Page 367 )
Classification Societies did not lag behind in their contributions to safety and
environmental protection. Following the rest of the shipping industry, leading
classification societies developed safety and quality management classification
services in the early 1990s. There is a new concept of ‘Total Safety’ growing up in
the boardrooms of classification societies which would eventually contribute to
safety and environment protection.
According to the Carver report, there is a general tendency to shifi from a
prescriptive approach to a Safety Plan approach by means of a formal safety
assessment.
This more scientific approach is of the utmost importance and will contribute to
improving ship safety. It must be applied to new buildings at the design stage.
The principle behind the Total Safety Concept is to provide the maritime sector with
comprehensive safety information on the ship, its management and crew. (Livois,
1996, 144)
It was in March 1990, that the Norwegian Ship owners Association published the
‘Guidelines on quality management for ship operation’. The purpose of such a
guideline was to provide guidance in the development and implementation of
management for ship operation with regard to safety and environment protection.
Primarily the guidelines were intended for companies responsible for the operation of
ships carrying oil, chemicals or passengers. These guidelines were developed in line
with the IMO Resolution A. 647 (16).
HELMEPA (Hellenic Marine Environmental Protection Association) of Greece co­
operated with different associations which represented Greek Ship owners and
Seafarers in order to publish guidelines based on IMO Resolution A. 680 (17). These
were named voluntarily Guidelines on Management for Safe Ship Operation and the
Prevention of Pollution.
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Contributions by way of publishing of Standards and Recommendations by the
following bodies need to be appreciated.
- International Chamber of Shipping ( ICS )
- Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF )
- Society of International Gas Tankers & Terminal Operators ( SIGTTO )
- International Tanker Owners Pollution Federations ( ITOPF )
- International Association of Independent Tanker Owners ( INTERTANKO ) .
The P&I club towards their contribution to maritime safety and environmental
protection have set up their own standards for the safety management of ships on the
following aspects.
0 - written procedures
0 - safety policy
0 - ship maintenance schedule
0 - manning and training policy
contingency plan
publications
With regards to the efforts towards safety and pollution prevention the club has
always upheld the initiatives of the IMO and the shipping industry. In fact it is
required by the club that ships should carry the standard publications or equivalent
where relevant.
The I.loyds_Iteg_ister Quality Assurance ( LRQA ) has launched a scheme which
incorporates the requirements of both the International Standard Organisation and the
International Maritime Organisation Resolution A. 741/18, to suit its purposes on the
grounds that safety and environmental protection are integral to effective
shipmanagement system. They have also published a comprehensive guidelines for
Shipmanagers interested in Safety Management Systems.
3.0 QUALITY RELATED TO SAFETY
3.1 Quality in Shipping
Ensuring safety of personnel, property and environment is of paramount importance
in the functions of any shipping company management.
Safety in relation to quality may be defined as a perceived quality that determines to
what extent the management, engineering and operations of a system are free of
danger to life, property or environment.
The achievement of above objectives can not be accomplished without the fitness for
use, operational reliability and contractual performance of the service rendered by a
shipping company. These are indeed the key elements of quality of service.
A series of well publicised marine disasters have focused attention, throughout the
world on the existing poor quality of service in terms of the short comings of
substandard ships and sub standard shore management etc. The result of all this
attention has been the recognition that it is high time and there must be a move
towards improvements in the quality of service in the broad spectrum of the shipping
industry.
In order to provide safe and environmental friendly shipping strict adherence to the
key elements of quality of service is absolutely necessary for the entire of the
shipping industry.
Hence in the changing shipping industry today, quality of service is very much linked
with the safety. The quality and safety management are not transient issues any more
and preferably should be addressed together.
For a shipping company willing to comply with the doctrines of quality of service in
its true essence, it is necessary to understand the three key elements of quality of
service.
3.2 There are three key elements of quality:
0 - fitness for use
0 - operational reliability
0 - contractual performance
1. Fitness for use:
Fitness for use may be described as the total composite product and service
characteristics of marketing, engineering, manufacturing and maintenance through
which the product and service in use will meet the expectation by the customer.
2. Operational Reliability:
Clearly part of a product or service will depend on its ability to function satisfactorily
over a period of time and it is this aspect of performance that is giving the phrase
operational reliability.
It is the ability of the product or service to continue to meet the customer
requirements. Operational reliability ranks with quality in importance, since it is a
key factor in many purchasing decisions where attentions of the customers are being
considered. Many of the general management issues related to achieving product or
service quality are also applicable to operational reliability.
26
3. Contractual Performance:
This aspect of quality of service is not possible without the service being properly
managed. It just does not happen at its own. Clearly it must involve everyone in the
process and be applied throughout the organisation.
Failures to meet the requirements in any part of a quality chain has a way of
multiplying, and failure in one part of the system creates problems elsewhere, leading
to yet more failures, more problems and so on. The price of quality is the continual
examination of the requirements and our ability to meet them. This alone will lead to
‘acontinuing improvement of the whole philosophy of quality of service.
3.3 Quality Related Terminology.
The term quality, its definitions and various other terminology and their
interpretation are stated in quite different styles by almost all the famous authors of
the subject. At this stage, it is felt necessary to express the definitions and
interpretations as they have been used in the preparation of the following part of the
concerned subject.
Quality: It is the adequacy of a product or service for the real present
and fiiture needs of users. In some instances quality is
associated with a statutory requirement to establish if a
service is fit for purpose.
Adequacy: This can be defined as a perfect relation or equivalence
where something appropriate corresponds perfectly to its
ptupose, and and is therefore suitably adopted.
S3f¢tY3 A Perceived quality that detennines to what extent the
management, engineering and operations of a system are
free of danger to life and property.
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Process: The transformation of a set of inputs, which can include
actions, methods and operations, into desired outputs in
the form of products, infonnation, services or general
results.
Quality Policy: The over all quality intentions and directions of an
organisation as regards quality, as formally expressed by
the top management.
Quality Assurance: All those planned and systematic actions necessary to
provide adequate confidence that a product or service will
satisfy given requirements for quality.
Quality Control: This consists of checking after the fact that a product
complieswith statutory or contractual requirements.
Quality Management: That aspect of overall management function that determines
and implements the quality policy.
3.4 Quality Control in Shipping Industry.
To optimise quality objectives, it was necessary to have some form of quality
assessment. It was the manufacturing industry which initiated the process of quality
assessment. Basically it meant the post production inspection by the customer of the
finished product to detect and reject all those products which did not comply with the
standard specifications set by the industry. This method of quality assessment by the
end user of the product was termed as quality control.
The quality control procedures adopted brought about extra expenses in the form of
wastes, reworking or rejecting of non confonning products. These expenses were
considered as a cost of quality which indeed added to the costs of the finished
products.
Likewise in the shipping industry, in order to improve upon the quality of services, a
number of measures were adopted to ensure a rigid quality control. The measures of
quality control adopted are evidenced with various mandatory and contractual
requirements imposed on the shipping companies.
Undoubtedly the objectives of the mandatory and contractual requirements effected
through a number of surveys and inspections are to achieve a required standard of
quality in shipping. The point of argument could be that these numerous surveys and
inspections to a certain extent are carried out by organisations having their particular
interests in the various aspects of the common maritime adventure. The purpose of
such examinations appear to be focused merely on to ensure compliance with
mandatory obligations or fulfilment of contractual requirements. Their contributions
towards building up of quality assurance in the system it self appear to be very little.
The focus of many a quality effort adopted appears to be mis-directed. In most
organisations 90 % of the quality efforts goes into finding what is wrong and putting
it right, and only 10 % into preventing it going wrong in the first place, an
investment in prevention looks the better bet. (Milican,l993,35).
It is noticeable practically on board ships that the quality assessments are carried out
through a number of assessors as follows:
0 - Flag State surveyors looking after the interests of the administrations
0 - Port State surveyors looking after the interests of their administrations.
0 - Terminal Operator surveyors looking alter the interests of the terminal
0 - Classification surveyors influencing the interests of the charterers, shippers and
consignees.
0 - Surveyors looking after the interests of P & I clubs
0 - Underwriters looking afier the interests of hull and machinery
0 - Surveyors dealing with damage claims, e.g. salvage associations
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o - Time charterer's surveyors
o - Voyage charterer’s surveyors
o - Potential charterer’s surveyors
From the point of view of shipping companies the aforesaid tools are adopted by the
vested interests of all those concerned ( but the shipping company ) in ensuring their
own comforts and survival.
For shipping companies such a host of surveyors and inspection is very expensive. In
fact over-emphasis on these examinations as a quality tool could be counter­
productive.
Moreover an inspection or survey can only certify that an item fulfils a requirements
or specifications, at the time of the inspection. This can create a complacent attitude.
An inspection can not assure continuous compliance with requirements.
We can already see that a lot of efforts is being directed towards finding out what is
wrong and then setting it right.
The emphasis of quality tool should be on proactive, rather than reactive approach.
Ideally quality can not be inspected into product or services, customers satisfaction
must be desired into the whole system. Conformance checks then make sure that
things go according to plan. (Oakland,l989,8)
Therefore 90 % of the quality efforts should be devoted to prevention of non
conforrnities and 10 % to quality control. This quality control should consist of a
confonnance check or verification during the process and not after the process is
complete.
For a shipping company this could be best demonstrated by comparing the
considerable efforts which goes into training and resources needed to fight a fire,
rescue a casualty or evacuate a ship, to the minimal amount of effort spent in
providing education, correct procedures and resources to prevent the occurrence of an
incident in the first place.
Perhaps the most radical changes that must take place will be in this area of forward
thinking and planning in all aspects of management of shipping.
The system must address the satisfaction of the customers expectations. This often
tends to be taken for granted. Where the ship has failed to meet expectations the
results are sometimes so expensive that litigation may almost be inevitable and the
actual costs of the failure is increased by the legal costs which are incurred in settling
the dispute.
In view of the customer satisfaction to be designed into the whole system rather than
inspection of quality into finished product or service stage, the advantage in the shifi
of emphasis to prevention was realised.
Quality Assurance measures were thus adopted by the manufacturing industry fi'om
the 1980's onwards. It was recognised that the system would built in the quality
concept into the product or service. Hence quality assurance was accepted as a sound
management technique to optimise long term profitability.
The growing interests in the quality standards led to the International Organisation
for Standards ( ISO ) initiating work in 1983, on an Intemational Standard using
existing British Standards ( BS 5750 ) as its basis, where several years of user
experience were taken into account.
In 1987 the ISO 9000 series of five standards were approved by the European
Committee of Standardisation ( CEN ) as a series of five European Standards ( EN
29000 to 29004 ) without modification.
The ISO 9000 series Quality Standards, published in 1987 was adopted by the
manufacturing industry to provide quality assurance for their products.
At present the ISO 9000, is a series of six interrelated standards.
ISO 9000: 1987 Quality management and quality assurance standard guidelines
for selection and use.
ISO 9001: 1987 Quality systems - Model for quality assurance in design
development, production, installation and servicing.
ISO 9002: 1987 Quality systems - Model for quality assurance in production and
installation.
ISO 9003: 1987 Quality systems - Model for quality assurance in final inspection
and tests.
ISO 9004: 1987 Quality management and quality system elements - guidelines.
ISO 9004-2 1991 Guide to quality management and quality system elements for
services.
The principle concept of the ISO 9000 series quality standards is that an organisation
should achieve the 3 objectives specified in ISO 9000 series.
1 The organisation should achieve and sustain quality of the product or service
produced so as to meet continually the purchasers stated or implied needs.
2 The organisation should provide confidence to its own management that
intended quality is achieved and sustained .
3 The organisation should provide confidence to the purchaser that intended
quality is being or will be achieved in the delivered product or service provided.
When contractually required, this provision of confidence may involve agreed
demonstration requirements.
ISO 9002 is considered to be the most appropriate model for contractual situations
when the specified requirements are stated in terms of an established design or
specific action such as a ship and shipping operations. Hence by the late 1980's, the
shipping industry adopted this series as its quality assurance techniques.
It is to be noted that the elements of 9002 need to be adapted for application to the
shipping industry. In doing so consideration need to be given to safety of life and
property at sea, safe navigation, compliance with national and international
regulations and customers requirements.
For the purposes of the ship and its operations, the tenn ‘purchaser’ does not only
mean the customer of the transportation service offered by the shipping company.
This term needs to be viewed in a broader perspective. The Flag state, Port state, and
Society in general are all entities with expressed and implied needs such as for safety
and environmental protection to be fulfilled by the service offered by the shipping
companies.
3.5 Total Quality Management
The term quality has for too long been misused to its application as solely for the
purposes of conformity to a specification. Total quality concept would reflect a
company's ability to respond effectively to the multiple needs of the market. In its
broader spectrum it calls for an organisation and its resources should be concentrated
on providing the right response to the changing needs of every customer, which
includes the flag state, port state and the society as well. The application of the
concept is based upon the internationalisation of quality with a focus on the
principles of continuous improvement.
There are two possibilities to achieve Total Quality at present
0 - Quality Assurance Program
0 - Quality Improvement Program
Each of the two programs have their own merits and demerits. A Quality Assurance
Program is based on a strict approach towards achievement of quality and as such it
necessciates controls of documentary evidence to be produced to the customer in
accordance with the contract. The great advantage of this system is that it minimises
the risks of errors if followed suictly.
A Quality Improvement Program provides for adaptability to the situation and
opportunity for creativity in the system but if such a creativity is not utilised for
carefully channelled and targeted projects, it would prove out to be a waste of
precious time and energy.
In order to comply with Quality Assurance Program two factors are essential:
0 - Internal audit
0 - Periodical management review
Thus the quality control and assurance are achieved on the basis of aclcnowledged
commitments.
The main aim of a Quality Improvement Program is to achieve a better overall
performance of the existing system with the idea of simplifying the system whenever
possible and improve the efficiency. The two objectives are sought through:
0 - annual quality improvement goals and
0 - voluntary suggestions expressed by the employees.
As a result the Quality Assurance Program provides confidence in the Total Quality
System and its continuance is ensured an awareness of all ideas for improvement,
where as the intrinsic motivation of the individual in Quality Improvement Program
are made to contribute to the Total Quality System. (Chavel,1995,24) .
The theories of Total Quality Management are relevant to the Shipping industry,
provided these are adapted to the maritime situations. (Millican,l992,50) states:
The practices methods and tools which have proved to be
successful when used in manufacturing should not be ignored but
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neither should they be copied without modification in an entirely
different context or in a different culture.
Shipping companies have had no difficulty in applying traditional
management methods in ways which fit their particular
circumstances and the working and culture of the industry. The
same has to be done with the tools and methods of quality
management if they are to become an integral part of the way the
company operates and not just the proverbial flavour of the mouth.
However while applying Total Quality Management Systems in a shipping
company, its success would still depend upon the four basic requirements i.e.
Leadership with commitment, Organisational goals, Total quality culture and the
proper Training.
4.0 THE ISM CODE, BENEFITIAL TO SHIPPING COMPANIES
I a.minstituting a new order of business which will put safety
where it belongs; in the hands of the owner and operator. We
carmot enter the twenty first century with the attitude of
business as usual.
Attributed to Admiral Kime ( USCG)
DNV( 1995 )
The International Safety Management Code is the standard for establishing a system
for the safe management and operation of vessels and for pollution prevention.
This system will have to be approved by the Flag administration or an organisation
recognised by it. Shipping companies which will adopt the ISM Code shall be issued
with a Document of Compliance by the Flag adminisuation or an organisafion
recognised by it.
For the first time in the maritime history the company ashore ( the office and not just
the ship ) has to be approved and have a certificate. Thus the Document Of
Compliance would serve as a licence to be an operator of ships.
4.1 Reasons for Compliance with the ISM Code.
There are at least four good reason for the adoption of the ISM Code.
0 - It makes the ship a safer place to work, provides safe working practices and
develops a safe working environment on board the ship.
0 - It protects the sea and the marine environment.
o - It clearly defines the jobs for the individual, and therefore it makes it easier for
the employer and the employees. It will boost the morale of the employees thereby
increasing their efficiency.
o - It would attract good crew, passengers, shippers, charterers, even classification
societies and underwriters and the P and I Clubs.
Above all it is the law. Compliance with the ISM code is required by Chapter IX of
the SOLAS 1974 Convention.
The code was adopted by the IMO through Resolution 741 (18). This was given
mandatory effect by the contracting Governments for the SOLAS 1974, on 24 May
1994.
A new chapter, chapter IX - Management for the Safe Operation of Ships, chapter D(
sets out definitions relevant to the ISM Code. It also covers application of the
regulations, obligations relevant to establish and maintain the Safety Management
System, certification, verification and control to be established by the Flag state
This amendment will be considered to be accepted on 1 January 1998, under the tacit
approval system. The amendment shall enter into force on 1 July 1998. Passenger
ships including passenger high speed crafi of 500 gross tonnes and over are required
to comply with the provisions of chapter IX of SOLAS 1974 not later than 1 July
1998. Cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units of 500 gross tonnes and above
are required to comply with these regulations by 1 July 2002.
4.2 ISM Code Requirements
The ISM code and the [MO guidelines have a ftmctional approach rather than a
detailed approach. This has been done with a purpose to suit adaptability of different
kinds and circumstances. Therefore it is not a “ Cooks book " and leaves a lot of
room for improvements and adjustments according to further developments.
Adhering to its basic objectives it is a continuous self correcting approach.
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The code is divided into the following 13 sections.
1. _Gsn:ral
This gives an introduction to the general purpose of the code and its objectives.
2. Safetv and " ' ‘ F ‘ " Policv
The company must put in writing its policy on the safety and the protection of the
marine enviromnent and make sure that everyone knows about it and follows it.
The company must have sufficient and suitable people both in the office and on
board the ships with clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
4. D_e:i£nat:d£crss2iLAshoLe
The company must appoint a person in the office responsible for monitoring and
following all SAFETY and ENVIRONMENTAL matters of the vessels.
5.
The master is responsible to make the system work on board. He must help his crew
in following the system and give them instructions when necessary.
The master on the ship shall uphold safety and pollution matters above all other
considerations.
6. B.csourccs.and£_e:snnnel
0 The company must employ the right people on board and in the office and make
sure that they all:
0 - know what their duties are
0 - receives instructions on how to carry out their duties
0 - get trained when and if necessary.
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7.
It is required to plan the work on the ship and follow the plan when working.
8. Emflzemxhsnmedness
Every one should be prepared for the unexpected ( emergency ) . It can happen
anytime. The company should develop plans for responding to emergency situations
on board its vessels and practice them.
.9. es.1“"‘““&¥' ‘ 0mIrrPnN=<
No person or system is expected to be perfect. This section of the system gives a way
to correct it and improve it. It is necessary to make a report on finding anything
wrong including accidents and hazardous situations. It should then be analysed so the
whole system can be improved.10.
The vessel and its equipment must be maintained in a good condition. Compliance
with the rules and regulations is imperative. It is also essential to maintain and
frequently test those pieces of equipment that are important for safety and
environmental protection. Records of the works carried out must be maintained.
11. Documentation
The safety Management System must be put in writing i.e. documented and
controlled. Such doctnnents must be available both in the office and on board ships.




The company must have its own internal methods for making sure that the system
works and is improving.13.
The flag administration or an organisation recognised by it, will have to send external
auditors to check the company's system in the office and on board each ship.
After it has satisfied that the system is working the flag administration will issue a
Document of Compliance for the office and a Safety Management Certificate for
each ship.
SOLAS 74 - chapter IX defines the identity of an entity called ‘company’,
Company means the owner of the ship or any other organisation or person such as the
manager, or bareboat charterer, who has assumed responsibility for the operation of
the ship from the owner of the ship and whom by assuming such responsibility has
agreed to take overall duties and responsibilities imposed by the international Safety
Management Code.
Chapter IX requires the company to comply with the requirements of the ISM Code.
( IMO Guide lines on the application of the ISM Code ).
4.3 Benefits to Shipping Companies.
In the past decades, people have seen enough results of disastrous accidents at sea.
The cash amount of financial losses have literally thrown many a shipowner out of
business while others are struggling to survive.
In general up to 4.6 % of the nmning costs of a modem Panamax type bulk canier
are attributed to insurance related items. The cost of an accident is not always in cash
terms but in the human tragedy with loss of ships and the damage caused by
enviromnental catastrophes. At times this has resulted in the formulation of unilateral
laws by the port states who would always wish to protect their territorial interests. It
40
is also not uncommon that the media coverage would exaggerate in describing a
particular situation to give a big blow to the individual company's reputations.
Preventing losses means saving of money. While implementing the ISM Code it is an
opporttmity for shipping companies to become efficient enough to prevent such
losses and save money.
Undoubtedly the development and the implementation of the ISM code would cost
money to the shipowners. The expenses involved in the implementation of the ISM
Code would be comparatively less for better established, safety conscious shipping
companies, where a sort of a safety management system has always been in practice
in good old traditional way. Perhaps there would be some expenses involved in
including the procedures of the shipowners office into the system, its monitoring and
control.
Whatever the expenses be, it may be considered as an investment. It is indeed
difficult to establish the balance between the costs and benefits so as to work out the
return on the investment. The fact is that costs are apparent, mainly direct and
quantifiable. The benefits on the other hand are something in the fiiture, arguable and
could be interpreted anyway.
Although the benefits are difficult to quantify on account of compliance with the
ISM Code, the benefits may include:
0 - cost saving
0 - improvement of the physical condition of the ship
0 - increase of productivity
0 - reduction of off hire
0 - reduction of average
0 - reduction of number of accidents
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But then these benefits need to be measurable. Taking the example for a particular
ship the measurement need to be compared with a standard value. Then the standard
deviations from the standard value must be worked out. It is also necessary to analyse
the general trend. All this process take time to show up its results and during this
period the chances are that some of the parameters would have changed. It is
therefore not easy to make an exact estimation of the return on investment.
However to make a business decision , we need to be convinced that the benefits in
compliance with the ISM code are greater than the expenses of the implementation.
Thus it need to be proved that:
1 Non compliance of ISM code costs money
2 Cost savings due to implementation of the ISM code
3 Cost savings are greater than the costs of implementation of the ISM Code.
The costs of non compliance at times is very obvious. An example of this could be
the founder-ing of the Herald of Free Enterprise because the bow door was not
properly secured.
To prove 2 & 3 above, a case study was made a few years ago for a shipowner with
25 ships.
A total time of two years was utilised in the implementation of the system.
The total costs of 400,000 USD was utilised for the implementation of the system.
The break down of this figure is as follows.
0 - staff time 100.000 USD
0 - external assistance (including payment to two extra employees during the
period of implementation) 100,000 USD
0 - Training courses and meetings 150,000 USD
0 - misc 50,000 USD
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Hence in order to implement the ISM Code, the costs involved was an yearly interest
on the loan of 400,000 USD and administration costs. In the case referred to, the
costs of management was said to be around 100,000 USD per year.
Cost Savings due to implementation of the ISM Code.
­
Costs for repairs, planned as well as unplanned, should definitely be reduced as a
result of the implementation of the ISM Code, because the number of unexpected
break-downs should be reduced due to a more systematic supervision.
‘Prior to the implementation of the ISM Code, the cost was found by regression
analyses of the actual costs. The cost model used for this purpose looked like this:
Cost = a0 + a1"size + a2"‘power + a3*age + a4"'productivity + a5*main engine type
(two stroke/four stroke) + a6"'shaft generators (yes/no) + a7*main engine firel quality
+ a8"'auxiliary engine fuel quality.
( a subscript denotes constant)
A model of this kind will normally reflect about 75 % of the costs. The remaining 25
% are due to other parameters including the individual performance of the crew
members.
The standard deviation from the mean value of the repair cost was found to be about
50,000 USD. (Munk & Madson, 1995,3)
With the implementation of the ISM Code, all ships were found to be performing as
well as the best third. The saving was worked out to be about 25,000 USD per ship.
A saving of just 20,000 USD per ship per year is therefore not unrealistic after a
couple of years with ISM Code in practice.
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. I : 1. . _
Improvements in the physical condition may safely be regarded as savings of cost.
The physical condition of a ship may be evaluated by giving marks to the different
areas and pieces of equipment on board for instance between 1 and S, 1 denoting a
perfect condition and 5 denoting an unacceptable condition. The sum of the mark
will then fonn a measure for the condition of a ship.
Increased productivity may also be regarded as savings of cost. Engine hour per year,
kw hour per year, transported tonnes dead weight times nautical miles per year and
number of port calls per year may be used as measures for productivity.
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Number of off hire days is a good and easy established measure for the efficiency of
the shipboard management. Further, it is easy to transform this value to a cost value.§fi
Number of cases of average is an easy measure, too. A cost value is normally found
but a measuring value for the severity is difficult to define.
" ‘ ’ numberof "““"""
Number of personnel accidents is also a good measure, but it is difficult to define a
measuring value for the severity of an accident and impossible to attribute cost values
to the individual accident.
Cost Saving is greater than the Costs of the implementation of the ISM Code.
Alone with reference to the savings in the repair costs of the case referred to above.
All costs regarding the implementation of the ISM Code would be recovered, if the
saving is realised only for 5 ships.
Savings caused by reduced Off hire days, reduced number of cases of Average and
reduced number of Accidents are then pure profits to the shipping company.
However the most important benefits, namely safety, prosperity and commercial
developments, are of immaterial nature and cannot be compared directly to the
implementation costs.
4.4 Quotable Quotes
A major accident has the potential to cause multiple fatalities and I or extensive
pollution and the COSTS can be enormous. The bill for Exon Valdez spill amounted
to 2.5 billion USD. ( BELLAMEY)
Some of the problems of not identifying the COSTS of non compliance with ISM
code are in hind sight. What is obvious is that poor safety operations increase risks
leading to disasters. (ANGAS )
If you think safety is EXPENSIVEtry an accident. ( Chairman British Railway)
Prevention is not only better but CHEAPER than cure. There is no necessary conflict
between humanitarian and the commercial considerations. Profits and safety are not
in competition on the contrary safety at work is good business. (BUTLER)
Defects are not free, somebody makes them, and gets paid for making them.
Prevention is the COST of getting it right. Appraisal is the COST of finding that you
have got it wrong and Failure is the COST of getting it wrong. ( GRANNEY)
45
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISM CODE IN A SHIPPING COMPANY
Having realised the long term benefits and advantages and the timely need to comply
with the ISM code an establishment of a well designed safety management is
extremely essential. Such a system shall help to reduce not only the disastrous
incidents but will also to a great degree reduce the probability of minor casual
accidents on board ships to achieve long awaited objectives of safer ships and cleaner
oceans.
5.1 Pro requisites of successful implementation.
Safety at sea is not achieved by regulations and mere pieces of papers, or by fancy
pieces of equipment. What is important to realise is that it requires willingness and a
complete commitment effort from top to bottom on board the ship as well as on
shore organisation. This is only achieved by complying with the following pre­
requisites:




One of the most important and difficult tasks to achieve is the derivation of a
proactive attitude, at all levels within a company, towards safety and pollution
prevention issues. For this purpose, it is essential that all the company’s personnel
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are in the position to perform effectively the duties imposed by the safety
management system, which in turn depends on the allocation of sufficient resources.
A positive safety culture means caring for the safety of the organisation's activities
and out comes.
This caring for safety should be reflected in the norms, beliefs, roles, attitudes and
practices within the organisation. A positive safety culture is one in which not only
those with a specific safety function care about adverse out comes, but also front line
workers and their management as well. This means that safety is important to all
personnel at all levels and are integrated with the daily practices at the different
levels of action.
Every employee of the shipping company should understand the factors of individual
failures which are undesirable in a shipping company for safety reasons. These may
include, mischief, ignorance, rnisjudgements, folly, negligence, alcohol/drug,
laziness, lack of seriousness, undue fatigue, sloppiness etc.
Good ship management depend on a culture of safety where safety issues are given
high priorities in the boardrooms as well as on board the ships. This culture which
will encompass all aspects of a company's shipping operations will undoubtedly
influence the successful mnning of the company and its ships at all levels.
Figures from the Health and Safety Executive show conclusively that between 70 and
90 percent of accidents have their root causes in organisational failure, Investigations
into the disasters of the 80's such as the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Piper Alpha
and the Space Shuttle Challenger all proved beyond doubt the truth of this
conclusion.
It is therefore important for the shipping companies or ship operators to know some
of the salient factors which play a role in organisational failure to achieve safety
culture. Some of them may include, management style, rules and regulations,
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communications (including language problems), time pressure, morale and
appreciation.
The participative decisions making democratic leadership style and individual job
satisfaction are all positively co- related with low accident rates. At the same time
excessive bureaucracy may successfully prevent a few accidents but in doing so it
may create unfavourable attitudes that will more than out-do the benefits.
Sea going personnel must have the full support of efficient intelligent management to
perform properly. Really excellent crews can make ships run well despite poor
management for a short while, but poor management is bound to undermine morale
with the result that good crew members will leave and accident rate will rise.
Excellent management will always have the ability to convert poor crews into good
crew by motivating and training of those who are trainable and willing to work.
Equally important is getting rid of those who are not trainable and not willing to
work. There is nothing unfair and unethical about it. It is against the best interests of
safety and thus the well-being of seafarers as a whole to allow irresponsible misfits to
remain at sea to cause harm to the responsible majority. Many a flag state and union
leaders of today acknowledge this, and they are a great help to management in
promoting safety.
The highest standards of safety management would of course be achieved through a
step by step process aimed at continuously improving the system on the basis of
experience gained.
5.1.2 Motlvatlon
Motivation could be defined as the feeling that drives someone towards a particular
objective. The aim of the motivation is to create conditions such that the people in
the organisation can achieve their own goals by directing their efforts towards the
success of the Safety Management System and the shipping company as a whole.
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The available personnel may bring miraculous results in the overall efficiency and
output of the organisation if resourses are exploited positively.
For seafarers and for the people in the shipping companies, generally money and
benefits with job security are the strongest motivators. Together with this recognition
for good work and loyalty would provide the job satisfaction to the people involved
in the development, implementation and successful continuation of the Safety
Management. In addition rewards for safety must be encouraged by the shipping
company.
5.1.3 Training
The importance of training and education in any management system need to be
emphasised again especially in the fields of safety, operations of ships and its
maintenance. With the advancement of technology, the need is yet greater on the
ships of today with complicated equipment and smaller crews.
Shore based personnel and shipboard personnel who are expected to undertake
functions related directly to the proposed safety management need to be trained in
relevant aspects of the safety management system.
For Shorebased Personnel
The company should conduct properly constituted training courses, which will have
to be followed up by a period of on -the-job farniliarisation. In this regard drills and
exercises may be utilised to make up any deficiencies in the training as well as the
safety management system.
To update them with any proposed major changes, the shorebased personnel will also
require refresher courses at regular intervals. Newly appointed personnel and those
who are newly assigned duties related to the system are required to undergo a
farniliarisation prograrrune before assuming their responsibilities in the system. This
programme shall include reading and understanding of all safety management system
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documentation, computer based farniliarisation programme, video instructions and
on-job-training.
For Shipboard Personnel
The familiarisation programme necessary for the ship board crew other than the
master, senior officers, watch keeping officers/engineers should include the
following
0 Safety and environmental policy
Ship particulars
0 - Organisation chart
Safety and pollution hazard & precautions
Safety and pollution prevention practices.
Video instruction on safety management system.
In the preparation of the above information, publications of the International chamber
of shipping would be very helpful.
The farniliarisation programme for watch keeping officers / engineers shall include
all above and in addition:
0 - reading and understanding the company’s shipboard safety management system
documentation.
0 - computer based familiarisation programme.
0 - stipulation of minimum handing - over - period.
As for the master of the ship and senior officers, they should be formally briefed by
the company prior to their joining of ships with information as below:
0 - all information required by watch keeping officers / engineers as stated above.
0 - overview of the safety management system
0 - specific details of the safety management system on board the ship.
It is a good practice of shipping companies to maintain a record of the safety
management system training undergone by their personnel.
5.2 Pollcy Commitment for the Safety Management System
An example of such a policy document is given below. Fig 5.1
HEALTH, SAFE TYAND THE ENVIRONMENT
The management wish all the employees to be fully aware of the company policy on
health, safety and protection of the environment.
The aims of the policy are:
TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF ALL EMPLOYEES AND
OTHER PERSONS. TO CONSERVE THE ENVIRONMENT. TO AVOID DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY.
In all activities account will be taken of the need to :
Aim for the elimination of work-related injuries and illness.
Aim to avoid all pollution and protect the environment.
Aim to comply with both the letter and spirit of all relevant legislation and International Conventions.
The management:
Believe all injuries on board can be prevented by high standards of safety consciousness, personal
discipline and individual accountability.
Will actively promote employee participation in measures to improve their health and safety both
ashore and on board ship.
Will keep employees fully informed of known or potential hazards that might affect them.
Will use their best efforts to prevent accidents and m.ini.miseharm from accidents that may happen.
Require the commitment of all employees to safe operating practices and to work towards the
elimination of personal accidents and unhealthy practices.
IGIOW YOUR SHIP, KNOW YOUR JOB
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Adhering to the requirements of the ISM Code and the IMO guidelines on the same,
it is the requirement to set up a safety and environmental protection policy with
commitment from the top.
A safety and enviromnental protection policy should be consistent with the laid down
objectives of the ISM Code and the company's safety management objectives. The
shipping company must establish, implement, review and maintain a clear written
safety and environmental protection policy. It is this document which should provide
the guidance in the direction of maintaining an efficient safety management system.
As a requirement of commitment by management, it is necessary that the top
representative of the shipping company fiilly understands and signs this document.
5.3 Tools of Implementation
A good shipping company which has a good background of safety culture,
motivation and training should have not much difficulties in the development and
implementation of the safety management system by using the following appropriate
tools for the purpose:
safety assessment (identification of risks)
documentation as per the requirements of the code
monitoring of the system
review of the safety management system.
5.3.1 Safety Assessment ( Identification of Risks )
In a successful safety management system of a shipping company the aim of the
organisation is to focus on the development and implementation of controls which
could ideally provide harmless means to achieve the objectives of safety and
environment protection. Safety assessment is a systematic process employed in
identifying and then analysing the risks and hazards which are associated with all
activities or operations carried out. It is a very useful tool in establishing the risk.
A hazard is an undesirable physical risk which is capable of giving harm and / or
damage t0 3 PCPSOII.property and / or environment. In this regard a risk is the
probability of a hazard occurring in a specified period or under specified
circumstances and conditions. The safety assessment is principally carried out in the
following steps:
0 - identification of risks
a - analysis of the causes of the risks
o - evaluation of risks.
It is extremely necessary for a correct application of the process of safety assessment
that it should be based only on establishing how safety is actually being managed and
not on how it is expected or believed to be managed. The efforts should be truly
unbiased and without any pre conclusions. With such safety assessment applications,
the procedures and methods thus developed shall result in a less hazardous style.
Referring to the ISM code objectives which require a company to establish safeguard
against all identified risks, the hazard identification will provide the basis for
fulfilment of the requirements.
Ross (1994, 226 ) has classified methods of hazard identification as follows:
Hazard identification techniques generally fall into two categories,
comparative and fundamental methods. The comparative method would
simply consider all previous hazards encountered on similar ships or ship
systems, and consider if these hazards were present on the proposed ship
or system. A more thorough technique is a fundamental method known as
Hazard and Operability Studies ( HAZOPS ). The intent here is to
examine systematically all project activities and processes through the
use of keywords or a combination of guide words and parameters using a
multi disciplinary approach.
0 HAZOPS will examine processes and activities both on board and in the
shore management in order to identify likely hazards and operational
problems. Thorough hazard identification will require a complete
understanding of the process or activity being examined. The study will be
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most effective when conducted by a multi disciplinary team. The team
should consist of experienced ships staff, ships superintendents, fleet safety
manager, personnel manager, commercial manager, maintenance and
repairs manager and training manager. The team must have a chairman who
is familiar with I-IAZOPmethodology. The discussion and findings must be
recorded. Members of the team must have a thorough knowledge of their
area of specialisation and its relevance to safety management systems. The
HAZOPS team should focus upon various activities and operations carried
out separately for each type of ship the company has (general cargo,
container, oil tanker etc), in a systematic fashion and identify all hazardous
malfiinctions and faulty processes. Relevant publications and sources of
information need to be referred to, such as:
0 - national legislation, codes and guidances from a ships flag state
state.
international Conventions, codes and recommendations
product information
expert advice and opinion
record of previous accidents and incidents within the organisation and
other organisations
personnel knowledge and experience of managers and employees
0 - industry or trade association guidelines, ( e.g. IMO; ICS; ISF; OCIMF;
CEFIC; SIGTTO ).
The hazards which are linked with almost all types of ships and which need to be
considered will inevitably include fire, explosion, collision, stranding or grounding,
personnel injury, pollution, pirate attack etc.
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Additionally on tankers there are hazards of canying highly dangerous cargoes,
uncontrolled release of hazardous cargoes, inadvertent mixing of incompatible cargo,
reaction of cargo with air, water or other materials.
While developing shipboard procedures, those procedures which have a potential of
creating the identified hazards such as above must be closely examined during
analysis of the causes of hazards.
Through procedures particular attention should be drawn to the need to adhere to
strict instructions for such shipboard operations where an error may immediately
cause an accident or a situation which could threaten people, the environment or the
ship. Some of the examples of Critical Operations for which Critical Procedures will
be required are found in the IMO Guide lines on the Implementation of the ISM
Code.
A triggering event usually provides the initial failure in a system and then proceeds
through a sequence of events until it culminates in a hazardous outcome. The cause
analysis process traces the chain of events in every operation or activity to identify
the event which has caused the hazard. There are two methods employed in the cause
analysis process. These are Event Tree Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis. In the
Event-Tree Analysis method, it is necessary to flowchart every relevant procedure or
activity. The point of commencement of the analysis is the point of failure in the
sequence of procedure. The probable event sequence afier such a failure in the
system are traced to find which combination of events will precipitate a hazardous
situation. The intention of this exercise is to establish how a triggering event could
lead to a specified hazardous outcome (pumproom explosion). If a branch of the trace
leads to a non hazardous outcome it is not traced any further.
The limitation of this method is that the same outcome could also arise from other
causes which would not be apparent from a single trace. The advantage of this
method is that a whole range of outcome can be analysed from the same tree.
The fault-tree analysis method starts with the hazard as the starting point and traces
backwards to identify the faults which lead to the hazard. This method is less
complex as only those faults which directly contribute to the hazardous outcome
need to be traced . Each hazardous outcome can be represented by a separate fault
tree in which many events interact to produce other events by a simple logical
relationship ( And, Or etc. ). Separate outcomes will require separate trees. The fault­
tree analysis method may be termed as a top-down technique and is often the
preferred method.
On conclusion of cause analysis, a description of the hazard development process is
obtained and receptors are identified. Receptors are persons, environment, ship/shore
system and property affected by the hazardous event.
Once the hazards are identified and their cause analysed, it is necessary to evaluate
the risk of estimating the probability of occurrence and assessing the consequence of
the hazard. The probability and consequences of a hazard can be evaluated by its
effect upon receptors. A qualitative analysis can be undertaken.
In a qualitative evaluation a judgemental ranking of the hazard from past experience,
is expressed on a qualitative scale for the likely hood and consequences of the
hazard. A qualitative scale and method of evaluation was proposed in a submission
(MSC 65/24/2) by the UK, at the 65"‘session of the MSC in May 1995. An example
of the scale is given in table 5.1. High risk hazards will be located in the top right
hand comer of the matrix. The matrix will make it simpler to identify unacceptable
risk levels and develop controls to reduce the risks to acceptable level.
When developing controls the following criteria can be used:
0 control measures for risks which could create catastrophic consequences, even if
they are infrequent, should be given greater priority than risks which create only
small losses.
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o where two risks have the same consequences the control measure should address
the one with the higher likelihood first.
Examples of such scales are: Table 5.1 Source: MSC 65/24/2
LIKELIHOOD
could be expected in the installations lifetime
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Having defined the scales, a group of operators with relevant experience can be
brought together to place judgmental ranking on the hazards. These rankings are
placed on a matrix format which allows the high risk hazards to be identified





1 2 3 4
Consequence Categories
qualitatively in order that only those hazards of significance are carried forward to
fault or event tree development. If appropriate, ranking can be applied during the
hazard identification exercise, as part of the HAZOP study.
An example of a risk matrix is given above. According to the example scale given
above, high risk hazards would fall in the top right hand comer of the matrix.
5.3.2 Documentation
All activities which can affect safety and environmental protection must be analysed
through safety assessment process in order to categorise them as critical and special
activities, so that procedures for key activities could be written with due diligence
according to their level of importance.
It is required of a company to provide laid down procedures in the safety
management system documentation for;
0 - shipboard operation ( ISM Code 7.0 )
emergency preparedness ( ISM Code 8.0 )
non conformity, accident, hazardous occurrence reports ( ISM 9.0)
ship maintenance ( ISM Code 10.0 )
0 - maintenance of documentation.
Procedures should not be written in a way that will result or stop an operation being
undertaken. It is not necessary to produce endless pages of procedures. In fact in
order to gain ready acceptance by the people who have to read and use the manual,
the presentation of the information contained within them is an important part of
making the documentation user friendly. Therefore the documentary system must be
sensible, easy to operate and easy to understand,. The use of flow diagrams, sketches,
drawings and checklists will go a long way towards having easily understood
procedures and work instructions. The understanding of the documentation will be a
crucial element in the satisfactory implementation and operation of the safety
management system.
The whole process of documentation need to take into account the safety and
environmental protection policy, national and international regulations and the results
of the safety assessment.
It is therefore strongly recommended that manuals and documents should be drafted
by some one of the appropriate discipline, i.e. navigation procedures by an
experienced deck officer, and engine room procedures by an experienced engineer.
Once the drafi is prepared it should be reviewed by the management representatives
to ensure that laid down procedures follow a common format. The management
representatives should ideally comprise of a superintendent ashore with seafaring
experience.
How many manuals a shipping company will be required to produce to meet the
requirements of the ISM Code is not specific. It is a matter which each company will
have to consider lmowing their own operational scopes. A large fleet with many
different types of ships and trades may have to have a bigger pile of manuals than a
relatively modest sized shipping company with only a few different types of ships or
special trades.
It is most likely that the Main Company Manual may comprise of several large loose­
leaf folders. Each section of the listed contents may be contained in separate folders.
Such a structure for reference documentation will make it easy for updating
documents when corrections are required to be done.
Below is the Proposed Structure of Documentation as modified from Guidelines
on the application of the ISM Code ( 1994, 32 )
MAIN COMPANY MANUAL Fig 5.2
COMPANY’S MANAGEMENT MANUAL
line managers and employees.
Objectives and descriptions of the company’s SMS






MAIN SHIPBOARD MANUAL Fig 5.3
Shipboard Management
Manual
Safetl’/Tl'8iI1iI1g Emergency/Contingency Cargo Handling
Manual Planning Manual Manual
The following table provides an example of a list of contents of a Company
Management Manual. Table 5-2
COMPANY MANAGEMENT MANUAL
List of Contents
1.0 Safety and Environmental Policy




6.0 Environmental Pollution Prevention
7.0 Safe Shipboard Operations
8.0 Personnel and Training
9.0 Rules, Regulations, Laws and Codes
10.0 Administration
11.0 Documentation
12.0 Auditing and Review
Modified from: Training course documentation, Piraus, January 1995, DNV
Safety and Environmental Policy
It is necessary that the Safety Management System of a company should be exactly
in lines with the Safety and Environmental policy. The first section in the contents of
this Main Company Manual should speak for this.
Trade and Fleet Information
In this section of the contents, there should be a brief description of the company's
business with particular reference to the trade. The section shall in addition contain a
formal strategy it intends to adopt for the implementation of the stated Safety and
Environment policy
Organisation
The structure of the organisation and all the departments of the shipping company
together with their inter relationship must be expressed clearly. It should also define
the responsibilities of the individual and their communication relationship such as
contact, ship/shore, relevant authorities, and other relevant organisations. The section
should also describe the overall job descriptions of all personnel involved with the
company's Safety Management System. Sometimes it may also be necessary to
provide more a detailed description separately in the task description of the Office
Management Manual. The section should also state the laid down procedures for the
delegation of responsibilities in the case of an absence of senior decision makers. In
compliance with the ISM Code, the nomination of Designated Persons who are
entrusted with the responsibility and authority by the company to perform
inspections and verification must be formally identified in this section. This must
also define the duties and responsibilities of the Designated Persons. Safeguards to
preserve the independence of the Designated Persons are also required to be stated.
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Safety Management
In this section of Safety Management the description of the Safety Management
System should provide an overview of the documentation both shipboard and ashore
through a block diagram or equivalent means, so as to enable hierarchical structure of
the manuals and documents to be understood by the users. The documentary
procedure and frequency for periodical reviews and evaluation of the Safety
Management System will be portrayed by drawings or in description in this section.
The principle and methods of accident/near misses/non conformity reporting, and
management review/verification shall be outlined here.
Personnel Safety
This section of the Company's Management Manual is dedicated to Personnel
Safety. All matters regarding occupational health and safety of employees should be
dealt with in this part of the manual. The set procedures to inform shipboard
personnel regarding health hazards of oil, chemical and liquefied gas cargoes must be
clearly defined. If the company has established a health maintenance programme for
shipboard personnel, then this section should cover the details about this.
Environmental Pollution Prevention
This section is dedicated to environmental pollution prevention. The policy of the
company in this regard must be reiterated by writing. It should also outline the
procedures intended for the prevention of pollution on part of ship and shore
management. If the shipping company has oil tankers in its fleet, it would be a good
Practice for the company’s environmental pollution prevention measures to be in
consistense with the Safety of Pollution and Environmental Protection (SOPEP).
Safe Shipboard Operations
For safe shipboard operations, the International Chamber of Shipping guidelines on
the paragraph 7.0 of the ISM Code, necessiates the formal identification of
shipboard operations where safety and pollution prevention are important. classifying
key shipboard operations into special and critical shipboard operations is achieved in
this section. Similar information is also provided in the Shipboard Manual. The
required safeguards and the monitoring functions are to be clearly defined in this
section.
Personnel and Training
In compliance with the requirement of paragraph 6.0 of the ISM Code , the company
is required to provide details of the personnel and their training in the Main
Company Manual. This section must describe the procedures adopted by the shipping
company for the selection and recruitment of ship's personnel. It should also indicate
the manning requirements, qualifications and medical fitness. The procedure adopted
for briefing to the senior officers prior to their joining of ships in order to ensure that
they are fully conversant with the Safety Management System must be mentioned in
this section of the manual. Likewise procedures for familiarising new personnel and
those personnel nansferred to new assignment in connection with safety and a
pollution prevention must be defined. The company’s policy on drug and alcohol
with a description of the measures for its enforcement on the ship need to be stated.
All the training requirements both for the shipboard and shore based personnel is
described for this part.
Rules, Regulations, Laws and Codes
Realising the fact that the regulatory environment of shipping is continually changing
it IS necessary for the Safety Management System to ensure continued compliance
with the updated rules, regulations, laws and codes. This part of the Main Company
Manual will describe the process and procedures adopted in ensuring that all the
concerned persons on board and shore are updated with the latest contents of the
inforce regulatory regime. The purpose can be served by delegating a department in
the shore management the responsibility of communicating the updated information
on the relevant rules, regulations, laws, recommendations and codes.
Administration
It is needless to say that a good ship board administration is required to ensure safe
ship operations. All administrative procedures to ensure safe operation of ships must
be laid down. This would among other things include matters such as safety,
maintenance, spares, stores, docking, repairs, communication, data system and filing
system.
Documentation
For proper management of the documentation in the Main Company Manual, it is
equally important to provide laid down procedures for identification, distribution,
collection and maintenance of Safety Management System documents, drawings,
manuals, instructions and other publications. The procedures to incorporate changes
in the documentation must also be clearly defined.
Auditing and Review
Auditing and review is a part of the Safety Management System . The laid down
procedures for conducting internal audit and review of the Safety Management
System must be mentioned in this part of the Main Company Manual . Procedures
for reporting audit findings and escalating the findings to higher management if not
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responded to within specified period of time, should be provided. A list of the
specific areas to be audited should be mentioned. It is also necessary to mention the
qualification of audit personnel.
PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT MANUAL.
The departments of the shipping company likely to be involved could be personnel,






2.0 Personnel and Training
3.0 Main Shipboard Manual
In order to ensure practicability of these documented procedures it is recommended
that each section of this manual is authorised by relevant departments and signed by
the heads of department. This process will help involving various departments into
the Safety Management System and thereby promote the Safety Culture in the
Company.
However an exclusive fleet safety management department is inevitably required to
be incharge of the Safety Management System and as such ensure co-ordination with
other departments to achieve the objectives of the company's Safety and Pollution
Prevention policies.
Professional activity
The section of professional activity require the inclusion of the following important
matters:
ship technical operations, procedures, special and critical operations
ships maintenance system. Essential and critical functions ( maintenance
manual)
communication with ship
assistance to ship in day to day operations
mandatory regulations. Certificates. Assistance to master
deck and bridge operations, procedures, special and critical operations
bridge and navigational equipment and publications.
Personnel and Training
The section of personnel and training is required to contain the following necessary




annual training plan budget
basic education, certificates ( recognised/approved institutes )
for crew members, selection procedures, technique and criteria
language requirements and testing
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0 - periodical performance evaluation, its information and follow up
o - deck cadet and engine trainee training programme
Main Shipboard Manual
The section of Main Shipboard Manual, will provide a duplicate copy of all the
documentation of Safety Management System, kept on board the ships. Besides the
Shipboard Management System, the section provides the manuals of Safety/Training,
Cargo handling and Emergency/Contingency plans.
CONTINGENCY PLAN
The Shore based Contingency Plan and The Shipboard Contingency Plan must work
in conjunction with each other. For all practical purposes these should be a common
plan which would cover both the shipboard and shore based emergency response.
Basically such a plan should include the following:
a. Contingency Policies
b. Emergency Preparedness Ship and Shore
c. Emergency situations, Procedures/Checklists
c. Oil Pollution (cargo, bunker, lube oil)
d. Additional requirements of Oil Pollution Act ( OPA)
Meeting with the needs of a contingency plan ( Ship and Shore ), an Emergency
Response Plan has been developed which would provide emergency guidance to
both shipboard and shore based personnel. The Emergency Response Plan is
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intended to optimise the emergency response time and to ensure maximum shipboard




1.0 Introduction - Purpose & Scope of ERP





3. Emergency Organisation - shore
ship

















5.0 Training and Drills Ship and Shore
6.0 Ship-specificplans, muster lists, information and other details
7.0 Contactum
8.0 Record of Revisions and Distributions
(MacGregor, 1994, I4)
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1.0 In the Introduction section of the ERP, the geographical coverage area of the
plan must be defined. Purpose and scope may be translated as the reason of having
such a plan and whether the intended plan is a local, regional, national or an
international Contingency Plan.
2.0 Proper communication within the ships personnel is as important as the ship
shore communications which must be established properly and in accordance with
the laid down procedures. The section should emphasise on the use of a common
language which is also expected to be understood internationally. It should provide a
guide line on matters such as:
o - activation of the emergency plan
0 - on board communications
0 - maintaining ship shore contact
0 - situation reports
All the proceedings how so ever small they may appear must be recorded. A
procedure of record keeping must be defined in this section. In emergencies,
obligatory as well as voluntary reports may have to be made. A guideline for making
such reports must be included. In the events of out side agencies getting involved,
proper methods of notification and dealing with subsequent inquiries shall need to be
stated as well.
3.0 This section requires a complete description of the overall emergency response
structure. It is to be noted that there would be separate suucture for ships and a
separate structure for shore based emergency organisation.
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The following details are required for Shorebased Organisation.
o - emergency response organisation ashore
o - outline of the shipboard emergency response organisation
0 - location of shorebased emergency headquarters
o - method of mobilising shorebased emergency responders
o - duties of shore personnel who are allotted a role in the ERP
o - procedures for post-emergency assessment on board.
In the case of a Ship Emergency Organisation, the following is stated in the ships
copy of the ERP.
0 - emergency response organisation on board
0 - duties of ships personnel in the shipboard emergency organisation
0 - procedure for post-emergency assessment on board
4.0 For various specified emergencies in this section, emergency response
procedures, flow charts and checklists are stated for both the Shorebased
Organisation and the Shipboard Organisation. An example of a flow chart is shown
on the next page.
5.0 Training and Drill section of the manual require the specification of the training
needs for emergency responders for both onboard and ashore. Many of the safety
conscious maritime nations and international regulations specify requirements for
drills. It is recommended to take these requirements into account when developing
this section. A proposed program of Shipboard drills for various emergencies is
shown on the page afier next. Likewise a program of Shorebased drills for such
emergencies may have to be established separately and incorporated in the
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Table 5.4 Sample Programme 01'Drills
Overboard
drill (MOB)





reporting for a coastal space
voyage and for a
regular port of call
bunkering











of an observed oil spill
FJA/C East Asiatic Company, Shipping Ship Management Services, (1995, 9 )
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6.0 Details required in the Emergency Response Plan for the ship are as follows:
0 - copy of the muster list
o - general arrangement plan
o - fire control plan
a - life saving equipment plan
o - stability information
o - list of plans, drawings and manuals on board with their locations.
7.0 The Emergency Response Plan contains a section which will provide contact
lists for the emergency responders. It should contain contact lists for:
0 - company contacts
0 - ship interest contacts
0 - coastal state contacts
0 - port contacts.
8.0 This section will help ensure the following important objectives.
- all copies of plan documents are maintained up to date
- copies of new documents, or revisions to existing documents are distributed
correctly
- infonnation passes through a validation and approved system before being
included in the plan
- records of production, issue, disuibution, revision and withdrawal of copies of
plan documents are maintained
0 - the fonnat, presentation style and appearance of plan documents are regulated.
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7.0 Inspection and Maintenance of Safety devices
and equipment
8.0 Rules, Regulations Laws and Codes
9.0 Non Confonnities, Break downs and Accident
10.0 Document Control
11.0 Safety/ Training Manual
12.0 Cargo Handling Manual
13.0 Emergency/ Contingency Planning Manual
Clear written procedures, and/or flow charts/check lists are to be provided for the
contents of the Main Shipboard Manual in their respective sections.
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1.0 Introduction
o - validity of the document.
o - a format to record revision, correction and updating of the manual
o - a distribution list, indicating all the locations at which a copy of this manual is
available.
2.0 Safety and Environmental Policy
0 - general nature of the company's policy relating to safety and environment.
0 - shipboard priorities to ensure successful implementation of the above policy.
0 - re-affirrnation of [MO Res A443 (XI) which clarifies the master’s oveniding
authority in matters conceming safety and pollution prevention.
3.0 Organisation.
0 - a description of the overall safety organisation of the company.
0 - a description of shipboard organisation chart, indicating department, personnel
and lines of reporting.
0 - list of duties and detailed job description of all personnel on board in matters
related to safety and pollution prevention.
0 - the inter relationship’s responsibilities and authority between the ship and
departments in the shore management must be described.
0 - the role and identity of the Designated Person(s) must be detailed.
4.0 Safety Management.
0 - recording procedures and methods of daily verifications by the ship master to
ensure compliance with master's standing orders and prescribed operational
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procedures.
o - at intervals of less than one year, method and procedure for the documented
periodical evaluation of the overall efficiency of the safety management system
as a master's review.
a —requirements of the safety committee meetings and the procedure of its record.
5.0 Personnel
0 - describes the normal manning scale for the vessel.
0 - describes the minimum manning scale.
0 - defines the level of competence and fitness for each person on board.
0 - describes procedures for handingjtaking over command of the vessel, including
details of specific matters to be checked at such times must be clearly described
0 - details the prescribed familiarisation procedures when change of personnel
occurs
0 - defines fleet drug and alcohol policy and random testing procedure for substance
abuse
0 - recording of external training undergone by shipboard personnel.
6.0 Shipboard Operations.
All procedures documented should incorporate international and national legislation
and relevant industry guidelines. For each operation, the duties of personnel involved
must be clearly defined. As all shipboard operations can affect safety and pollution
prevention, companies may consider analysing the procedures of operational
practices through safety assessment methodology in order to categorise them into
Critical and Special Operations. This is necessary not only to prioritise operational
sequences but this will help in allowing maximum level of attention while writing
procedures for those shipboard operations which are crucial to safety and to the
protection of environment. Some of the nonnal shipboard operational practices which
require documented procedures are published in appendix 4 of [MO guidelines 1994
on the implementation of the ISM Code.
7.0 Inspection and Maintenance of safety devices and equipment.
0 - procedures to define the planned maintenance system for safety equipment,
commtmication equipment, load line items, pollution prevention equipment.
0 - description of how the test and inspection must be carried and the procedure for
making and following-up repair specifications.
8.0 Rules, Regulations, Laws and Codes.
0 - provide a list of the applicable publication available onboard.
0 - provide an update a master list of all standing certificates of the vessel.
0 - procedures to ensure the availability of up-to-date publications onboard.
9.0 Non Conformities, Break down and Accidents.
This defines the requirements for the master to report accidents and hazardous
occurrences including all the near misses. It should provide a standard fonnat for
reporting, together with the description of making such reports.
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o - provide a document master list indicating holder, location and current revision
details of each document.
o - procedure defining control of all documents related to the SMS
o - procedures to ensure that obsolete documents are replaced with current issues.
11. Safety / Training Manual.
The existing Solas Regulation III / 51 require ships to carry the instructions and
infonnation on life saving appliances provided in the ship and on methods of survival
to be included in a Training Manual. By extending the scope of this manual to
accommodate safety and emergency training and drill, the new manual may safely be
addressed as Safety / Training Manual. Thus this manual should among other things
explain in details:
0 - frequency and description of safety drills.
0 - alarm signals.
0 - use of fire hoses, nozzles and hydrants.
0 - use of breathing apparatus, emergency life saving apparatus and oxygen
resuscitator.
0 - use of personnel safety equipment and fireman’s outfit.
operation of main and emergency fire pumps.
functions of fire detection system.
use and upkeep of hand-held radio transceivers.
0 - first aid and emergency medical treatment procedure.
donning of lifejackets and immersion suits, as appropriate.
0 - muster at assigned stations.
o - boarding launching and clearing the survival crafi.
o - release from launching appliance.
o — methods and use of devices for protection in launching areas where appropriate.
12. Cargo Handling Manual.
Due to the complexity of different types of cargo being carried at sea, the company
should develop a cargo handling manual suitable to the types of cargo their ships are
handling and the particular types of ships the company has in its fleet. The handling
of such cargoes shall be clearly defined in the shipboard cargo manual in the interest
of safety and environmental protection. While developing these procedures relevant
codes of safe practices for different cargoes must be consulted.
13. Emergency I Contingency Planning Manual.
It should comply with the basic requirements of a Contingency Plan as specified for
the Main Company Manual. A tailored version of the Emergency Response Plan to
suit the requirements of the individual ship shall be kept and maintained on board
each ship of the company.
5.3.3 MONITORING
In order to ensure that the established safety management system is functioning as it
is desired to function, it is necessary to set up a system of monitoring. This is
principally achieved by international auditing of the system and dealing with non­
conformity reports.
The prime objective of the internal auditing is to determine existence of the
commitment of the safety and environmental protection policy. The audit should
confirm whether defined procedures in the manual are in accordance with the current
requirements of the relevant regulations. The audit should verify that the process or
routine is in accordance with defined procedures with cross checking of records to
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procedural requirements with particular reference to procedures which are not the
norms e.g defects, accidents, delays etc. The audit should confinn what is actually
happening in practice. Thus the audit of a SMS ensures that the system, procedure
and the work instructions are being followed. The audits as well as possible
corrective actions should be carried out in accordance with documented procedures.
Frequency of internal audit of a management system depends upon:
0 - the number of shorebased personnel involved directly in activities of safety
functions of the company.
0 - the size of the fleet.
0 - the types of vessels in the fleet.
0 - reports on non conformities.
Once a system is implemented, as a general rule of thumb each area should be
audited internally atleast once a year. Due consideration should be given to arranging
audits at mutually acceptable times and ensuring that every one involved knows
about it. Failure to do such simple planning can demotivate the staff.
To ensure that the findings of the audit are acted upon, the Corrective Action Loop
forms a fundamental part of any management system. It is important that once the
system has been established that it remains alive. The implementation of corrective
actions as a result of the audit is the key method by which a system will evolve and
mature. The corrective action loop system must be effective irrespective of crew
changeovers. The following are the two corrective action systems:
0 - conduct follow up audits.
0 - the relieving master to review outstanding corrective actions at hand over.
Procedures in the manuals must ensure that all findings are made known to the
relevant personnel involved. The non compliance notes will require the person
responsible for the area being audited to sign acceptance of the findings as verifiable
evidence.
It is the requirement of the ISM Code and the ISO 9000 system, that the personnel
conducting internal audits should be independent and not have any direct
responsibility for the areas audited. It is a further requirement of ISO 9000 that
internal auditors are trained for the purpose.
As the internal auditors should have credibility in the areas they are auditing, it is
strongly recommended that only personnel with seafaring experience and thorough
and in-depth knowledge of the ISM Code are given the task of auditing the vessel.
Intemal auditors should possess the tenacity to defend the system and educate
auditees.
In order to comply with the monitoring aspects of SMS, the shipping company
should set up an audit team. For a modest size of a shipping company the audit team
may consist of three members. The team must have a fonnally identified leader. It is
necessary that the team establishes an audit program and schedule. In setting up the
schedule of the audits due consideration must be given to time consuaints such as
vessel's commercial schedule. The audit team must familiarise themselves with the
departure / ship specific documentation before the audit. It is always a good practice
to preview the previous audit reports and results.
The auditing process should commence with a pre-audit meeting. It is necessary for
the team to explain the scope and basis of the audit to the responsible personnel of
the area being audited. The audit team shall require relevant information from the
personnel regarding the area being audited. This pre audit meeting shall be useful in
creating a fi'iendly envirorunent for a fi'ee flow of communication between the
auditors and the personnel of the area being audited.
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It is the sole objective of the internal audit to seek objective evidence that the
described procedure is being followed in its true spirits. As such it is required of the
audit team to maintain a record of compliance and non compliance in accordance
with the procedures prescribed in the Main Company Manual.
The audit should conclude with a formal post audit meeting. The purpose of this
meeting would be to surmnarise the audit findings and formally presenting this to the
ship master or the head of the department as the case may be.
The final audit report should be prepared by the audit team and filed. A copy of this
report should be presented to the Designated Person with an advanced copy to the
head of the shipping company. It is the responsibility of the shipping company to
review the audit reports during the periodical review of the Safety Management
System. ( Larking, 1995, 3 )
The ISM Code requires the incorporation in the Main Company Manual of the
procedures ensuring that non confonnities, accidents and hazardous situations are
reported to the company, investigated and analysed.
0 - It is therefore the duty of the master to report back to the company all such
occurrenciesing of the non conforrnities. The report from the master must indicate
as to how the particular event came in existence and also as to how was it finally
resolved. In addition the report should include the following information:
0 - time and date of event
0 - personnel involved in event
0 - status of machinery during the event
0 - damage to equipment
0 - time of event record.
The internal audit team under the direction of the company should conduct a
thorough investigation based upon the report of the accident, near miss or unsafe
conditions. The sole purpose of the investigation will be to establish remedial
measures to prevent recurrence of the event. The event must be analysed during the
investigation to establish the cause such as unworkable procedure or a personnel
problem.
Where the analysis of investigation reveals the cause to be, unworkable procedure or
inadequate procedure, it may necessiate an amendment or reinforcement of the
existing procedures in the Manuals.
If the results reveal to be the cause of non compliance or the incorrect applications of
the correct prescribed procedures, the personnel need to be trained.
The records of all such findings and their outcome must be maintained. These
records help in identifying any latent trend. Such learning must also be
communicated not only to the relevant personnel in the organisation but also to the
training institutions for further education to mariners.
5.3.4 PERIODICAL REVIEW OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
It is a good practice of the shipping companies to periodically review their Safety
Management System before it is exposed to external periodical verification of the
SMS.
Such a periodical review must be conducted in accordance with the defined
procedures in the Main Company Manual and the outcomes documented accordingly.
The periodical review of SMS is in consideration to the following two factors.
0 - due to complexity of maritime industry, the legislation, conventions, codes,
standards and regulations are likely to change under the influence of the
dynamic maritime environment
0 - the results of audit, inspections and survey will provide new information
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
Even though shipping is the most regulated industry it has not helped as much as it
should. One of the readily apparent keys to the problem is that perhaps the industry,
or the people within the industry have not timely enforced and/or complied with the
regulations. The reasons behind this are complex. But the changes in the shipping
industry in the last decade has its contributions to these reasons.
These changes may include:
0 - reduced manning scales
multi language and multi culture crews




What has been recognised for a number of years is that approximately 80% of
accidents are caused by human error.
This is one area where the international maritime community has started to
emphasise “ Human Error Element". The task facing all shipping companies is to
ensure that every action affecting safety or the prevention of pollution taken at any
level within the company is based upon sound understanding of its consequences.
I“ this regard the [MO Resolution A 741 (18) (the ISM Code) emphasises:
---- --recognising also the most important means of preventing maritime casualties
and pollution of the sea from ships is to design, construct, equip and maintain ships
and to operate them with properly trained crews in compliance with international
conventions and standards relating to maritime safety and pollution prevention -——"
Recent studies into the human error element have also revealed that 70 to 90% of the
accidents related to human error involvement were caused by lack of a management
system.
The IMO Resolution A 741 ( 18 ) ( the ISM Code ), addresses this as:
“--—- recognising the need for appropriate organisation of management to enable it
to respond to the need of those on board ships to achieve and maintain high standards
9'
of safety and enviromnent protection, and ------- .
Shipping exists in a dynamic environment as ever. New things keep coming up all
the time, technology is advancing very rapidly, life at sea is changing accordingly.
As such it is not always possible to see what is the cause and what could be the
results.
Under such uncertain forecasts, a self correcting management system such as the
ISM Code system should be the best possible solution for the shipping of today.
Yet as with all management systems the ISM Code is only as good as the sum of its
parts. If at any stage any one of the involved parties does not accept the tenants of the
code, or does not embrace the requisite commitment with an almost evangelical zeal,
the inevitable result will be an expensive waste of time, energy and resources and
will lead to the collapse of the ISM Code and its morale.
Flag state administration also have a lot of role to play towards the success of the
ISM Code. There must be no relaxation of the requirements of the ISM Code in order
to attract tonnage to their respective registries and avoid migration of tonnage to
more amenable flags.
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The most important aspect of the code is to enforce an obligation on a shipping
company to set down safety management objectives by developing, implementing,
and maintaining its own system. Commercial practices must not be emphasised over
safety and environment protection matters. The master of the ship who is required to
uphold safety and environment protection over any other consideration must be safe
guarded to pursue his just decisions. This will necessitate the commitment not only
from the flag administrations but also from all those in the marine industry with a
responsibility towards safety at sea.
The underwriters and P&I club should take a leading role as well in rewarding the
shipping companies who realise the timely need of the ISM Code by complying with
its requirements and penalise the shipping companies who consider it all to be an
undue necessity. The tolerance, or otherwise, of sub-standard vessels and crews
which link of course a ) their profit, and b) the world opinion should hold centre
stage.
In many a cases, classification societies will be authorised for the verification of the
shipping companies and their ships for the issuance of Document of Compliance and
Safety Management Certificates, on behalf of the flag states. As such these
classification societies should not be acting as consultants to shipping companies for
ISM Code certifications.
However the overall effectiveness of the implementation of the ISM Code will be
marked by two extremes:
0 - its minimal effect on companies which are thinking and plamiing ahead and
implementing good management schemes.
o - its potential for dramatic effect on those shipping companies who wait until
pushed by the legislation and at the last minute fail to surmount the steep leaning
CIJIVC.
In reality, if a practical, accessible ISM Code is put into practice involving all staff, it
will provide real benefits to the shipping companies such as:
0 - improved maintenance
0 - reduced accidents and casualties
better communication
a better trained and more competent workforce
reduced off hire days
0 - reduced costs of repairs and liabilities
The shipping companies must now realise that compliance with the ISM Code will
provide them with an opportunity for improved perfonnance together with many
other benefits as highlighted above. It should not therefore be seen as a burden at all.
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